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Paul Krugman’s essay “Who Was Milton Friedman?” (Krugman, 2007a) seriously 
mischaracterizes Friedman’s economics and his legacy as well as the legacy of monetarism.
1  
Krugman also mischaracterizes monetary policy in the United States in the 1930s and in Japan in 
the 1990s.  In this paper we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues.  In the course of 
setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman’s main 
contributions to monetary policy debates and a picture of his impact on the policies of today’s 
central banks.   
We begin this rejoinder by summarizing Krugman’s principal misstatements regarding 
Friedman’s body of work and its influence on monetary policy formulation today.  Krugman 
indulges in inaccurate forays into economic history by attributing the depth and duration of the 
U.S. Great Depression in the 1930s and Japan’s extended slump in the 1990s to a liquidity trap, 
and giving an incorrect picture of the impact of monetarism on monetary policy (Section 1). 
In Section 2, we trace the development of Friedman’s ideas on inflation, beginning with 
the record of his opposition to the macroeconomic policies pursued in the United States during 
the 1960s and 1970s.  We also briefly review Friedman’s role in theoretical debates on inflation.  
We highlight differences between the views of Keynesians and those of Friedman.  Friedman 
rejected both the cost-push and the simple Phillips curve approaches that were emblematic of 
Keynesian 1970s inflation analysis.  We then describe the steps leading to Friedman’s 
modifications of the simple Phillips curve and his criticism of Keynesian “patched-up” versions 
of the Phillips curve.  
We next turn to the 1970s debates about price controls as the means of reducing inflation, 
and show that Krugman’s (2007b) statements about the 1970s debate on controls in his reply to 
our criticisms exhibited further misunderstanding of the importance of monetarist debates and 
the contribution of monetarism. 
We contrast Friedman’s view on incomes policies to those of his leading Keynesian 
opponents (James Tobin, Paul Samuelson, Arthur Okun, and Walter Heller). 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
1 Krugman’s essay appeared in the New York Review of Books on February 15, 2007.  Our Letter to the Editor in 
response to the essay, limited to 750 words by the magazine’s rules, and a reply by Krugman, appeared in the March 
29, 2007 issue (Schwartz and Nelson, 2007; Krugman, 2007b).  Our response dealt only with some obvious 
inaccuracies in the essay although it alluded to questionable versions of technical economic issues in Krugman’s 
commentary.  Apart from the space limitations the periodical imposed, The New York Review of Books is not an 
appropriate forum for a discussion of these issues.  This rejoinder serves that purpose.   2
We show that Krugman’s assertion that opposition to price controls was common ground 
among monetarists and non-monetarists is incorrect.   
Sections 3 to 5 then discuss Friedman’s further influences on modern monetary policy 
thinking. 
In Section 6, we refute Krugman’s claims that a liquidity trap characterized monetary 
policy in the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s.  For 
Krugman it is enough to note that short-term nominal interest rates are close to or at the zero 
bound to designate the two episodes as examples of a liquidity trap.  He neglects an investigation 
of the actual motivations of the policymakers involved, and so the factors that account for the 
policies they adopted; he also understates the scope that was available for achieving a successful 
monetary expansion. 
We conclude the paper in Section 7 with remarks on the credibility of Krugman’s 
portrayal of Milton Friedman. 
 
1.  Krugman’s misstatements in “Who Was Milton Friedman?” about Friedman’s economics 
      and about monetarism, as well as his assertions of existence of liquidity traps  
 
a.   On Friedman 
Krugman doubletalks throughout his essay.  How can he say Friedman was a great economist 
and a great man, if he believes Friedman to have been intellectually dishonest?  Or argue that 
Friedman was a man of courage, if he misled people? 
 
b.   On Monetarism 
According to Krugman, the generally successful monetary policies observed in the United States 
and other countries since the 1980s amount to an unambiguous defeat for Friedman and 
monetarism.  Krugman’s discussion is confused to say the least—for example, in treating 
Friedman’s work on inflation as separate from his work on monetary theory and policy.  
Krugman does certainly create the clear impression that monetary policy since the 1980s 
constitutes a return to the pre-Friedman, pre-monetarism status quo.
2  But the last 20 years have 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
2 “… ever since then [1984] the Fed has engaged in precisely the sort of discretionary fine-tuning that Friedman 
decried” (Krugman, 2007a).   3
not seen a return in the United States and other countries to the wage-price guideposts and wage-
price controls of the 1960s and 1970s; nor have they been characterized by anything other than 
wide acceptance of Friedman’s position that controls and guideposts were ineffective ways to 
fight inflation.  Replacement of these failed measures with arrangements in which central banks 
accept responsibility for inflation control, is a major legacy of Friedman and of monetarism—a 
legacy which Krugman (2007a), in attempting to press his case that “monetarism is now widely 
regarded a failure,” overlooks. 
  Does Krugman really believe that the principles monetarists advocated no longer 
influence the Federal Reserve and central banks in all advanced countries?  Does he deny that 
Friedman’s position that inflation is a monetary phenomenon has shaped monetary policy 
strategy around the world?  Does he believe that the distinction between nominal and real 
interest rates, which had fallen into virtual disuse in U.S. and U.K. monetary policy discussions 
until the monetarist counterrevolution, is not a central part of contemporary policymaking?  And 
what does he make of the public recognition of Friedman’s contributions to monetary economics 
by such senior policymakers as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, former Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, and Bank of England Governor Mervyn King? 
A recent evaluation of the contribution of monetarism by Michael Woodford (2007, p. 3) 
notes accurately that “monetarism established that monetary policy can do something about 
inflation, and that the central bank can reasonably be held accountable for controlling inflation.”  
This evaluation is inconsistent with Krugman’s dismissal of monetarism. 
In his reply to us, Krugman (2007b) objects that “to say that central banks now take 
responsibility for inflation is a long way from saying that monetarism has succeeded.”  But 
Krugman himself is on record as saying the following in a 1999 talk (Krugman, 1999): 
  We live in the Age of the Central Banker…Through much of the world, quasi-independent 
central banks are now entrusted with the job of steering economies between the rocks of 
inflation and the whirlpool of deflation.  Their judgment is often questioned, but their power is 
not… we have all become sort-of monetarists… 
   4
Therefore, in 1999 Krugman described the assignment of inflation control to central banks as 
evidence that “we have all become sort-of monetarists,” but in 2007 he claims that this 
assignment cannot be said to be a legacy of Friedman and monetarism!
3 
 
c.  Liquidity trap 
Krugman disagrees with the accounts of the Depression given in Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) 
and Friedman’s other writings.  Krugman (2007a) disputes the Friedman-Schwartz position that 
preventing the money supply collapse would have avoided the Great Depression, and even 
argues that Japan’s experience in the 1990s shows that central banks cannot increase the money 
supply much under Depression conditions.  These claims indicate a degree of hardline 
Keynesianism on Krugman’s part beyond that held by many of Friedman’s contemporary 
Keynesian critics.
4  Does Krugman really believe that U.S. monetary policy was helpless in the 
1930s?  Does he believe that the Federal Reserve could not have conducted large-scale open 
market purchases?  Does he deny that such operations would have prevented the collapse of the 
money supply and the economy?  In his reply to us, Krugman (2007b) confirms that he indeed 
embraces the extreme Keynesian answers to these questions—he believes that the central bank 
was largely powerless to raise the money stock, and that, if achieved, monetary expansion would 
not have revived the economy.  We argue the contrary case in Section 6, while also taking the 
opportunity to correct Krugman’s misstatements about Friedman’s work on the Great 
Depression.  Prior to that discussion, however, we consider the contributions of Friedman and 
monetarism to monetary theory and policymaking (Sections 2 to 5).  
 
2.  Milton Friedman’s position on inflation 
 
In this section, we provide a perspective on Friedman’s role in debates on inflation in the 
1960s and 1970s.  But as background for this discussion, we start with a brief review of his 
participation in theoretical debates.  This review highlights the differences between his views 
and those of Keynesians.  This allows us to bring out the corresponding differences between 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
3 Krugman’s 1999 remarks are downloadable from the internet (see our bibliography).  A published version has also 
appeared (Krugman, 2000). 
4 Krugman’s (2007a, 2007b) position about the power of monetary policy is more negative than the position 
advanced in his early work on Japan (e.g., Krugman, 1998).  In that early work he was already applying the label 
“liquidity trap” to Japan, but was nevertheless proposing monetary policy actions to revive the Japanese economy.   5
Friedman and Keynesians on policy issues in the 1970s.  Our review of these debates establishes 
that Krugman (2007b) is incorrect to claim that opposition to price controls was common ground 
among monetarists and Keynesians.  Our discussion of more recent developments emphasizes 
that the contemporary shift to inflation-oriented monetary policies reflects the influence of 
Friedman and monetarism. 
 
2.1 Keynesian economics and inflation 
 
And if price-levels are determined by money-costs, it follows that whilst an ‘appropriate’ quantity 
of money is a necessary condition of stable prices, it is not a sufficient condition. 
                                                                                                John Maynard Keynes (1943, p. 185). 
…monetary restraint is a sufficient condition for controlling inflation… 
                                                                                                  Milton Friedman (1980a). 
 
Friedman regarded monetary policy as the decisive instrument for controlling inflation. 
This position distinguished Friedman from Keynes himself—as a direct comparison of the 
Keynes and Friedman quotations given above makes clear.  Friedman further contended that 
monetary policy could not determine real variables such as output or employment in the long 
run.  Friedman’s stand on what monetary policy could do, and what it could not do, stood him 
apart from the predominant views associated with successive versions of Keynesian economics.  
The successive Keynesian positions were: (i) that inflation was a cost-push phenomenon 
independent of demand pressure (at least until output reached its full-employment level); and (ii) 
the early Phillips-curve position, according to which inflation did depend on demand pressure, 
but a menu of trade-off choices existed, whereby higher inflation could permanently buy lower 
unemployment.  We consider Friedman’s characterization and critique of each of these positions, 
before considering his own view of the inflation process. 
Friedman’s characterization of the Keynesian view of inflation.  Friedman (1953a, p. 
118) characterized the Keynesian view of price-level behavior as follows: prices were insensitive 
to increases or decreases in nominal aggregate demand so long as output remained below its full-
employment level; once output attained its full-employment position, on the other hand, prices 
absorbed any further increase in nominal aggregate demand.  He later described the rigid-price-
level assumption as “the distinctive feature” of Keynesian economics (Friedman, 1972a, p. 906),   6
prominent both in the work of “Keynes himself, and his American followers even more” 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 426).
5 
According to Friedman’s characterization, while Keynesian analysis did acknowledge 
that price fluctuations occurred while output was below its full-employment value, it did not treat 
these fluctuations endogenously.
6  Rather, as Friedman put it, prices and the inflation rate were 
treated as an “institutional datum.”
7  In particular, variations in inflation were attributed to 
exogenous cost-push forces.  Friedman emphasized that the view of inflation as cost-push was a 
form of Keynesian analysis which particularly received support from Keynes’ General Theory 
(1936).  A markup equation for prices, “link[ing] prices to costs, mainly wages,” with costs 
autonomously determined, was “derivable from Keynes’ system,”
8 and the treatment of inflation 
as cost-push was “more general [than the price-rigidity assumption] and perhaps more consistent 
with the spirit rather than the letter of Keynes’ analysis.”
9 
This characterization of Keynes (1936) was challenged in Friedman’s 1972 debate with 
his critics, with Friedman (1972a, p. 906) noting that three of his five critics disputed his 
interpretation.  But Friedman’s position is consistent with the views of Roy Harrod, Keynes’ 
biographer.
10  Harrod wrote in 1958: 
  I would venture to point out that the contrast between demand inflation and cost inflation is 
quite fundamental to what is known as Keynesian economics.  Those who regard cost 
inflation and demand inflation as similar phenomena should be regarded as pre-Keynesian.  
(Harrod, 1958, p. 115, para. 68). 
 
Harrod went on to say that Keynes’ practice in the General Theory of expressing 
variables in “wage units” was a means of abstracting from cost-push inflation when studying 
variations in aggregate demand.  Harrod’s statement is consistent with Friedman’s portrayal of 
Keynesian economics as a doctrine that espoused a cost-push view of inflation.  In addition, 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
5 More specifically, Friedman interpreted Keynes as assuming wage rigidity.  But Friedman treated this as implying 
de facto price rigidity (see, for example, Friedman, 1977, p. 468).  The perception of wage rigidity as implying price 
rigidity was consistent with standard representations of Keynesian economics, such as most traditional IS-LM 
analysis.  It also reflected Friedman’s preference for a “concentration on a few key magnitudes” (Friedman, 1972a, 
p. 908) and therefore often abstracting from “the margin between prices and wages” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, 
p. 446).  See also Friedman (1976a, p. 218) for a related discussion. 
6 See Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 49−50). 
7 See, for example, Friedman (1972a, p. 910; 1976a, p. 219); Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 42).  
8 Friedman (1972a, Appendix 2, point 11); Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 49). 
9 Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 61). 
10 See Harrod (1951).  Readers of Keynes (1943) will also find unmistakable support for Friedman’s characterization 
of Keynes’ views.   7
Harrod’s statement supports Friedman’s position that the rigid-prices assumption was a natural 
simplification in Keynes’ analysis because price movements served no economic function in that 
analysis when output was below full employment; instead of acting to clear demand/supply 
imbalances, price movements simply reflected autonomous cost variations, so it was logical to 
treat prices as rigid when considering demand-management issues.
11 
Simple Phillips curve approach.  Friedman acknowledged that later developments of 
Keynesian economics made the price level endogenous by replacing the assumption of rigid or 
exogenous prices when the output gap was negative, with the simple Phillips curve approach.  In 
the early Phillips-curve literature, inflation depended on the output gap (or on unemployment 
relative to its full-employment level).  Therefore, in contrast to early Keynesian analysis, the 
price level was now treated as endogenous for all levels of output.  Friedman (1977, p. 469) 
noted that the Phillips curve approach seemingly “filled a gap in Keynes’ theoretical structure” 
by adding inflation to the list of endogenous variables.
12 
 
2.2 Friedman’s view of inflation 
 
Friedman rejected both versions of Keynesian inflation analysis: the cost-push view and 
the simple Phillips-curve view. 
Friedman rejected the cost-push view in favor of the position that inflation depends on 
monetary policy via an aggregate demand channel.  “The price level and inflation are monetary 
phenomena,” he wrote, “not institutionally determined data to be analyzed by psychologists and 
industrial relations and industrial organization specialists.”
13  The factors typically cited as 
sources of cost-push inflation could not, in fact, have a sustained effect on inflation unless they 
were accommodated by monetary policy. 
Friedman’s objection to simple Phillips curve analysis, on the other hand, was that it 
preserved a form of money illusion.  The underlying inflation/unemployment or inflation/output 
gap relationship embedded in simple Phillips curves was typically motivated by appeal to the 
determination of wages and employment in the labor market.  Friedman (1968) argued that the 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
11 See Friedman (1972a, Appendix 2, point 9), and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 49). 
12 In addition, unlike early Keynesian work in which full employment corresponded to maximum feasible 
employment, Phillips curve analysis was more flexible by allowing for the possibility of positive output gaps (i.e., 
overfull employment), as Friedman (1976a, p. 218) noted. 
13 Friedman (1975, p. 176).   8
flaw in this approach was that it made bargaining over real quantities (i.e., the equilibrium level 
of employment or hours worked) a function of a nominal variable, namely nominal wage growth 
Δwt.
14  Traditional Phillips curve analysis imposed a form of money illusion by not including in 
the equation for Δwt an inflation term, with unit coefficient, that was needed to make the 
equation effectively a description of real wage adjustment. 
At the same time, a satisfactory Phillips-curve specification could not be obtained simply 
by adding current inflation (Δpt) to a Δwt equation.  The reason is that such a modification would 
make the equation one for real wage growth (Δwt – Δpt), with nothing to say about the 
determination of Δwt and Δpt separately; that is, it could not serve as an equation pinning down 
inflation behavior.
15  Friedman (1968, 1977) instead proposed a different modification, which 
still admitted a long-run interpretation of the equation as a real wage equation.  This proposal 
was to view the Phillips curve as describing the evolution of perceived real wage growth: for 
example, Δwt – Et−1Δpt.  Underlying this modified Phillips curve was the idea that contracts for 
nominal wages were negotiated conditional on last period’s expectation of this period’s price 
level.
16  The resulting Phillips curve was of the form Δwt = Et−1Δpt + ξu (ut – ut*); if Δpt is then 
substituted for Δwt via a constant-markup assumption, there emerges the expectation-augmented 
Phillips curve, Δpt = Et−1Δpt + ξu (ut – ut*).
17  The expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
simultaneously allows for a short-run inflation/unemployment relation for a given natural rate of 
unemployment (more precisely, a {Δpt, ut – ut*} relation); as well as the long-run absence of 
such a relationship, with ut invariably reverting to the natural unemployment rate ut* irrespective 
of the maintained inflation rate.  Phelps (1967, 1968) provided modifications to the Phillips 
curve that paralleled and overlapped with Friedman’s proposals. 
Though an explicit augmented-expectations Phillips curve was not written down in 
Friedman (1968) (appearing, however, in Friedman, 1970a, and Friedman and Schwartz, 1982), 
the discussion in Friedman (1968) provided a basic underpinning for subsequent developments 
of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and the natural rate hypothesis, including rational 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
14 Here wt is the log of the nominal wage index in period t, and Δ is the first difference operator. 
15 See Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 50). 
16 Friedman’s (1968, p. 10) terminology for the price level relevant to the wage decision was the “earlier price 
level,” but a more precise terminology, and one consistent with our use of Et−1Δpt in the text, would be “the previous 
period’s expectation of the current price level.”  Such an interpretation is consistent with Friedman’s (1977, p. 457) 
statement that the “perceived future average price” enters nominal wage agreements. 
17 As in traditional Phillips curve analysis, ξu < 0, to ensure that inflation responds to excess demand and supply.   9
expectations models with nominal price or wage stickiness such as those in Fischer (1977) and 
Taylor (1980).  That influence continues to be reflected in the modern literature that incorporates 
nominal price contracts into a dynamic general equilibrium environment.  An early study in this 
literature, King and Wolman (1996), noted the common themes with those advanced by 
Friedman, and the authors listed five elements which meant that their “model is monetarist.”  
These included the presence of temporary price stickiness, which implied “short-run non-
neutrality of money with long-run neutrality,” an implication they noted was “in line with the 
perspective of Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 1963b).”  The authors further observed that their 
model implied an “emphasis on expectations... in the tradition of Irving Fisher and Milton 
Friedman” (King and Wolman, 1996, pp. 83−84). 
Friedman (1977, p. 469) further criticized Keynesian economics for using “patched-up 
versions” of the Phillips curve that added explanatory variables, but did not make the vital 
modification of including expected inflation with a unit coefficient.  Starting with Phillips (1958) 
and Samuelson and Solow (1960), subscribers to a simple Phillips curve had tried to explain 
deviations from the curve by appeal to cost-shifting variables such as import prices or labor 
union pressure.  In Friedman’s view, as an empirical matter, a simple Phillips curve augmented 
by these additional explanatory variables was not an adequate substitute for the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve; and as a theoretical matter, adding these extra variables brought in 
cost-push factors as supplementary explanations of inflation, and so actually went back in the 
direction of treating prices as an institutional datum.
18 
 
2.3  Policy debates on wage and price controls in the 1970s 
 
Friedman’s analysis of inflation in the 1970s reflected his theoretical views.  He 
diagnosed the inflation problem in the United States and elsewhere as “excess demand” due to 
monetary ease.
19  He completely rejected wage and price controls as a solution, for several 
interrelated reasons.  One of these was traditional: controls did not genuinely remove inflationary 
pressure but simply meant that price signals were suppressed, creating shortages, or had to be 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
18 See Friedman (1976a, p. 219) and the discussion of the inflation equations in Solow (1969) in Friedman (1976a, p. 
228) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 446). 
19 See e.g. Friedman’s Newsweek columns “Burns and Guidelines” (June 15, 1970) and “Imitating Failure” (January 
11, 1971), reprinted in Friedman (1972c, Chapter 2).   10
transmitted in a less efficient way, such as via quality changes.  This line of argument paralleled 
the criticism of wartime price controls in Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, p. 557).  
Friedman’s remaining arguments against controls reflected the circumstances of the 
1970s policy debate and his reaction to it.  Cost-push theories were being revived as an 
explanation of U.S. inflation, and incomes policies (i.e., some variant of wage and price controls) 
proposed as the ideal way of fighting this inflation.  Friedman continued to reject cost-push as a 
credible source of sustained inflationary pressure: he knew of no postwar episode explicable by 
cost-push (Friedman, 1966), while the 1970s inflation was attributable to past monetary 
expansion, not wage-push (Friedman, 1972b).  Therefore, he saw no justification for incomes 
policy.  Controls and other actions on specific prices would transfer inflationary pressure to those 
items in the price index not subject to control.  With inflation due to excess demand, controls 
were counterproductive: not only did they take attention away from the genuine cure, which was 
reduced pressure on demand; by virtue of their perceived status as a distinct tool against 
inflation, incomes policies actually gave policymakers more reason to pursue expansion of 
aggregate demand. 
Accordingly, when President Nixon’s “New Economic Policy” of August 1971 included 
a wage-price freeze (to be followed by further phases of controls), Friedman’s Newsweek column 
was entitled “Why the Freeze Is a Mistake.”  Friedman warned in 1971 that proponents of 
incomes policy regarded it “as a substitute for demand restraint, not a supplement,” and would 
lead to the attitude: “Full speed ahead. The price freeze will hold back inflation.”
20 
Friedman’s opposition to incomes policy, his rejection of cost-push accounts of inflation 
behavior, and his calls for monetary restraint, are in contrast with the positions of leading 
Keynesians during the 1970s, as we will now show. 
 
James Tobin.  Tobin noted that a major difference on inflation policy between himself and 
Friedman was in their attitudes to incomes policies: 
  [Friedman] will not entertain wage and price controls or other incomes policies as 
alternatives or complements to anti-inflationary monetary restrictions… If they [i.e., 
monetarists] triumph, democratic capitalist economies will suffer high unemployment 
and slow real growth for some years to come.  (Tobin, 1976.) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
20 See Friedman’s Newsweek columns “Imitating Failure” (January 11, 1971) and “Why the Freeze Is a Mistake” 
(August 30, 1971), reprinted in Friedman (1972c, Chapters 1 and 2).   11
 
Tobin was therefore an advocate of incomes policies to fight inflation.  He saw cost-push 
as a distinct source of inflation, and one requiring direct measures: “if the real wages and profits 
demanded for producing output add up to more than the output produced, we will have to inject 
more competition, or alternatively control a la guideposts, into the setting of prices and wages.” 
(Tobin, 1966, p. 12.) 
In principle, Tobin supported monetary and fiscal policies that complemented the 
incomes policies that he wanted deployed against inflation.  But this did not lead him in practice 
to support monetary restraint during the 1970s.  Rather, Tobin endorsed the expansionary 
economic policies pursued in the United States.  For example, in lectures given in 1972, Tobin 
wrote approvingly of the shift to expansionary policies that the Nixon Administration had 
undertaken in 1971: 
  At the beginning of the Nixon Administration there were indications that the new 
Council and other top economists were taking a monetarist line… But events, common 
sense, and politics have prevailed… The New Economics lives after all.  (Tobin, 1974, 
p. 70.) 
 
In fact, Tobin advocated monetary and demand management policies for the United 
States over the 1970s that were even more expansionary than those actually followed.  In 
February 1977 he recommended that the Fed “lower significantly short-term rates… say, by 150 
basis points.” (February 4, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, 
1977a, p. 138.)  Thus, in addition to supporting incomes policies, Tobin supported the demand 
policies that produced the mid-1970s peak in inflation, and wanted a monetary policy even 
looser than that which produced the second peak of inflation in 1980.    
For Tobin, the contribution that aggregate demand management could make was in 
securing full employment.  From that perspective, demand restriction was justified when output 
threatened to exceed its full-employment level.  But constriction on aggregate demand in any 
other circumstances was damaging to the full-employment objective, and, in Tobin’s view, did 
not contribute to controlling inflation.  After the mid-1960s, Tobin rarely perceived the economy 
as being in an excess demand situation, and so often criticized U.S. monetary policy for being 
too tight. 
   12
Paul Samuelson.  Much of Paul Samuelson’s commentary on macroeconomic policy during the 
1970s took place in his Newsweek columns.  In these columns, Samuelson repeatedly stressed 
cost-push as a source of inflation.  In a late 1970 column, Samuelson acknowledged that 
“classical demand-pull inflation” had been a problem over the second half of the 1960s, but he 
argued that the situation had changed, and that inflation now reflected “the militant desire of 
union members” for wage increases.  This, he said, vindicated the “increasing emphasis on this 
new disease of ‘cost-push’ or ‘sellers’ inflation’” that he had put in his writings.  Samuelson 
continued, “What can be done about cost-push inflation…?  What is needed is some kind of 
successful ‘incomes policy’…”  Samuelson argued that incomes policy would leave demand 
management free to produce full employment without wage pressure.  (Newsweek, December 28, 
1970.)   
In his October 4, 1971, column, Samuelson said that President Nixon’s New Economic 
Policy was necessary, and that the year-to-end-1972 inflation rate would be 1% less than 
otherwise as a consequence of the introduction of wage/price controls.  In 1973, Samuelson 
argued that the next price-control phase “must bear down selectively hard on the few hundred 
largest industrial corporations which do have quasi-oligopolistic administered prices.” 
(Newsweek, July 23, 1973.)  In the late 1970s, Samuelson continued to support incomes policy, 
writing, “I’d counsel experimenting with tax rewards to price and wage moderation…” 
(Newsweek, January 2, 1978.) 
 
Arthur Okun. When the 1971 wage-price freeze was imposed, Okun (Chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisers 1968−69) said that it reflected a “newfound realism” on President Nixon’s 
part (New York Post, August 16, 1971: see Greenspan, 1971).  Okun continued to support 
incomes policies in subsequent years, focusing on incentive- and guidepost-based wage policies 
instead of wage and price controls.  He repeatedly advocated a cost-push view of inflation.  For 
example, in April 1977, Okun testified: “[T]he structure of the American economy clearly has 
been transformed… With cost-oriented prices and equity-oriented wages, excess supply cannot 
break the momentum of inflation and restore price stability.” (April 6, 1977, testimony, in 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, 1977b, p. 13.)  
Okun was a persistent critic of the use of monetary policy against inflation.  “Any 
professional economist who respects the facts must conclude, regretfully, that our momentum-  13
inflation cannot be brought under control by any reasonable fiscal-monetary strategy.” (Ibid, p. 
14.)  Okun also referred to “fiscal-monetary restraint, which has been thoroughly tested and 
proved a failure.” (Ibid, p. 15.)  The solution was incomes policy: “[F]iscal-monetary policy 
alone won’t do the job… And I think that countries that have adopted structural measures and 
incomes policies have found them worth having.” (Ibid, p. 36.)  A wage-guideline system was 
“effective in the early 1960s and I am hopeful that it will be once again.” (February 7, 1979, 
testimony, in Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, 1979, p. 150.) 
In contrast to Friedman, Okun repeatedly rejected the excess-demand diagnosis of recent 
years’ inflation, stating in 1978: “The inflation we have had in the last three years simply is not 
an excess demand phenomenon...” (April 24, 1978, testimony, in Ways and Means Committee, 
1978, p. 6341.)  Okun therefore argued that “fighting inflation by curbing demand at a time when 
it is not being caused by excess demand is absurdly inefficient.” (May 22, 1978, written 
testimony, in Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 1978, p. 17.)  In 1979, Okun 
testified: “any additional fiscal-monetary restraint would be an overdose, seeking to cure excess-
demand inflation when that is not the disease.” (February 5, 1979, testimony in Ways and Means 
Committee, 1979, p. 330.)  And he claimed: “During recent years, the price-wage spiral has been 
the most fundamental source of rapid inflation in the United States.  Any efficient cure for 
inflation must get directly at that source.  At the present time, the administration’s program of 
price-wage standards [i.e., guideposts] deserves our full support.” (Okun, 1979, p. 50.) 
 
Walter Heller.  Walter Heller (CEA Chairman 1961−64) wrote in early 1976, “American 
business seems to be losing many of its inhibitions about jacking up prices… The old formula, 
namely, focus on the concentrated industries and the powerful labor unions, and monitor their 
price and wage increases, makes awfully good sense…” (Heller, 1976, p. 59.)  Along similar 
lines, Heller testified that “Congress should bear constantly in mind that any balanced program 
for full employment without excessive inflation must contain some kind of restraint on excessive 
price increases enacted by concentrated industries and excessive wage increases enacted by 
overly powerful labor unions.” (March 10, 1976, testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 
1976, p. 247.)  In 1977, Heller said: “What the country faces is not demand-pull inflation, but the 
stubborn push of a price-wage or cost-price spiral that has to be tackled from the cost, supply, 
and incomes policy side.” (January 11, 1977, testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate,   14
1977, p. 31.)  Monetary policy actions against inflation, he said, would be ineffective: “our 
fundamental source of inflation is that price-wage spiral… [and] any attack on inflation [that] 
doesn’t include a direct attack on that… isn’t going to work.” (March 5, 1979, testimony, in 
Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1979, p. 46.)  Heller (1979) claimed that “three years of slack in 
the economy from early 1975 to early 1978… failed to dent the underlying rate of inflation.”  He 
wrote approvingly of “a vigorous policy of wage-price restraint to curb cost-push inflation… that 
is so resistant to economic slack and recession.” 
 
2.4 Friedman and modern monetary policy 
 
The preceding discussion has established that: (i) Friedman identified Keynesian 
economics with cost-push views; (ii) this interpretation finds support from a leading Keynesian 
who was one of Keynes’ biographers; (iii) Friedman’s concentration on monetary causes of 
inflation and Keynesians’ emphasis on cost-push causes are manifested in their respective 
positions on the 1970s inflation, with Friedman opposing incomes policies and criticizing 
monetary expansion, at the same time that leading Keynesians emphasized nonmonetary 
approaches to inflation control and analysis. 
It is clear that Friedman’s perspective has had a more durable influence on anti-inflation 
policy than the cost- and incomes-policy-oriented perspective taken by his 1970s critics.  Indeed, 
the adoption of inflation targeting and similar procedures by central banks in recent decades can 
be thought of as reflecting an acceptance of Friedman’s position that monetary restraint is both 
necessary and sufficient for inflation control.  While much of the discussion of monetarism in the 
1970s policy debates was formulated in terms of monetary aggregates, it was clear even in the 
1970s that a distinguishing feature of monetarism was the responsibility it assigned to monetary 
policy for the control of inflation.  For example, the member of the Federal Open Market 
Committee who was most sympathetic to monetarist views during the 1970s noted that “the 
implication is that monetary policy should be formulated with an eye toward controlling 
inflation” (Francis, 1974, p. 7).  This contribution of monetarism is borne out by the Woodford 
(2007) and Krugman (1999) quotations given in Section 1. 
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3.  Additional contributions by Friedman to monetary economics 
 
The influence of Friedman on monetary policy analysis is not limited to his extremely 
influential positions on the causes of inflation and on the need for inflation-oriented monetary 
policy rules.  Other aspects of Friedman’s work have been very influential on modern thinking 
about monetary policy.  Some examples follow. 
 
(a) The Fisher effect and the nominal/real interest rate distinction.  Both McCallum (2004) and 
Woodford (2007) acknowledge that the real/nominal interest rate distinction was a major theme 
stressed by monetarists.  As Friedman (1983, p. 2) observed, “inflationary expectations play such 
an important role in monetarist analysis.”  Friedman continually stressed inflationary 
expectations as a factor in the determination and interpretation of nominal interest rates.  
Friedman (1958, p. 183) had noted that once inflation becomes anticipated, “interest rates will 
rise to allow for the price rise.”  The danger of failing to distinguish between real and nominal 
interest rates, and so treating low nominal rates as synonymous with easy money and high 
nominal rates as tight money, was a theme Friedman consistently emphasized, notably in 
Friedman (1968).  As Friedman (1975, p. 176) put it: “Nominal interest rates must be sharply 
distinguished from real interest rates.” 
This stress on the Fisher effect distinguished monetarism from Keynesian analysis well 
into the 1970s.  Suppressing the nominal/real rate distinction when specifying the IS curve 
relationship was a flaw Friedman (1971, p. 330) emphasized in traditional IS-LM analysis: 
“anticipations of inflation… seem to me too important and too central to be pushed off stage…”  
But even years after 1971, traditional IS-LM analysis that abstracted from expected inflation, and 
so had the nominal interest rate instead of the real interest rate appearing in the IS equation, was 
still appearing in journals.  For example, Benjamin Friedman (1978a) undertook policy analysis 
with just such an IS-LM setup.  And when he did study the relation between nominal rates and 
inflation in his empirical work, Benjamin Friedman reached conclusions different from 
monetarist analysis.  He acknowledged that nominal rates in the 1970s had not kept up with 
inflation, but he interpreted this phenomenon as a financial market reaction rather than a 
reflection of easy monetary policy (B. Friedman, 1978b).   16
By contrast, Milton Friedman emphasized that the fact that nominal rates were below 
inflation was a sign that the Federal Reserve was creating excessive monetary ease.  The result 
was that nominal interest rates were much higher than they were in the 1960s because the 
liquidity effect of earlier rounds of ease had worn off, and the Fisher effect had emerged in the 
wake of the earlier easy periods, causing nominal rates to rise.  But real interest rates were low 
because the Federal Reserve was still following a generally expansionary policy, with each 
added stimulus tending to push unemployment and the real interest rate temporarily below their 
natural values. 
The convergence of economists to agreement with the monetarist emphasis on the Fisher 
effect played a part in the move to a new monetary policy regime.  Taylor (1998, p. 8) observes 
that “emphasizing the distinction between the real and nominal interest rate [was] part of the 
means” by which the Federal Reserve moved to a more inflation-control-oriented policy from the 
end of the 1970s.  This observation is confirmed by the newly released transcripts of the Federal 
Open Market Committee meetings for 1978.  At the July 18, 1978, FOMC meeting, the President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Mark H. Willes, observed,  
 
  Most of the economic theory that I know says that if you want to look at the real bite of 
interest rates, you also adjust for inflation.  And interest rates adjusted for inflation are not 
high at all. I think that is the sense [in which] we are not very tight.  In fact, we have had 
negative real rates of interest on Treasury bills, for example, for over two years.  This is in 
contrast with periods in the early ’60s and most of the ’50s when real rates of interest not 
only were not negative, but they were positive.  I don’t see how we can deal effectively, 
when we are at full employment, with accelerating inflation, and still have substantially 
negative real rates of interest.  So it does not bother me to have interest rates go up; I think 
they should go up.  If they don’t go up, I think we are simply guaranteeing more rapid rates 
of inflation, which will then guarantee, in turn, higher interest rates.  One of the most stable 
and profound relationships we have in all of economics is the relationship between inflation 
and interest rates, and I don’t think we hold [inflation] down by failing to move interest rates 
up now. (In Transcript, Federal Open Market Committee Meeting, July 18, 1978, p. 41.) 
 
Several years later, Friedman (1986, p. 644) was able to observe, “no one any longer 
disregards Fisher’s distinction between nominal and real interest rates.” 
   17
(b) Costs of inflation via relative price distortions.  Friedman (1958, p. 183) noted that inflation 
made it “more difficult to maintain the appropriate structure of relative prices, since individual 
prices have to change in order to stay the same relative to others.”  In Friedman (1974, p. 30) he 
elaborated on this theme, noting the coexistence of some predetermined prices and some prices 
that were able to increase when nominal aggregate demand changed.  In such an environment, “a 
slowdown of total spending produces substantial shifts in relative prices, which will sooner or 
later have to be corrected; the correction in turn will cause economic disturbances.”    
As Taylor (1981, pp. 57−58) observed, the “added risk and uncertainty about… relative 
price changes” was an element stressed in Friedman’s (1977) Nobel lecture and cited there as a 
reason why inflationary policies might produce a lower natural level of output and a higher 
natural rate of unemployment.  Thus Friedman’s writings emphasized both resource 
misallocation and economic fluctuations as likely to result from the distortions to the relative 
price structure produced by inflation.  Friedman’s (1974) proposed remedy was indexation if 
inflation continued; or better still, no inflation and no indexation. 
The New Keynesian literature has built on these themes of Friedman’s.  For example, 
Taylor (1981, p. 72) considered “relative price dispersion due to a mixture of [nominal] contracts 
of different lengths.”  New Keynesian analysis centers on the welfare costs associated with 
relative price dispersion (see King and Wolman, 1996; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; 
Woodford, 2003).  These costs are implied by the interaction of fluctuating inflation and 
staggered nominal price contracts.   
The explosion of work on relative price dispersion therefore represents another case of a 
Friedman theme that has been formalized and has become central to macroeconomics.  The 
vindication of Friedman’s position by the New Keynesian literature contrasts with the reaction 
by older Keynesians to Friedman’s relative-price idea.  For example, a U.K. Keynesian, R.C.O. 
Matthews, claimed in 1982 that none of the participants at a macroeconomic conference believed 
that appreciable costs of inflation came via the relative-price-distortion channel, and that he 
could not find anyone willing to provide a paper for the conference that argued that this was an 
empirically important channel (Matthews, 1982, p. 11). 
 
(c) Lags in monetary policy.  Friedman’s (1961, p. 464) phrase “long and variable lags” to 
characterize the response of the economy to monetary policy actions, has become so   18
commonplace that it is rarely attributed to him.  But it is worth remembering that Friedman’s 
emphasis on lags was challenged by Keynesian critics in the 1960s.  For example, Ando, Brown, 
Solow, and Kareken (1963, p. 3) contended, “Milton Friedman’s proposition that the effects of 
monetary policy actions on aggregate output are powerful, but occur with a very long and highly 
variable lag… simply will not hold water.”  They rejected Friedman’s emphasis on the response 
of aggregate output, preferring to study components of expenditure.  Their study concluded that 
monetary policy mainly works via inventory investment, which responds within a quarter to 
interest-rate movements (Ando et al, 1963, pp. 5−6).
 21  This position contrasts with the emphasis 
by economists today, in line with monetarists’ position in the 1960s and 1970s, on important but 
delayed responses of private consumption and all investment categories to monetary policy 
actions. 
 
(d) Dangers of relying on measures of potential output and the output gap.  As Orphanides 
(2003) stresses, Friedman continually warned of the fragility of estimates of potential output and 
the output gap and cautioned against giving them heavy weight in making monetary policy.  In 
light of the large errors in estimates of potential during the 1970s, that warning appears prudent.  
As early as 1979, an undergraduate textbook specifically identified with monetarists the view 
that U.S. output gap estimates were unreliable (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979, pp. 333−334). 
 
(e) Benefits of flexible exchange rates.  One of Krugman’s first papers, Dornbusch and Krugman 
(1976), was on the subject of floating exchange rates.  The opening page of Dornbusch and 
Krugman’s article observed, “The literature on flexible rates goes back to Milton Friedman, ‘The 
Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,’ in his Essays in Positive Economics.”  But this Friedman 
article (Friedman, 1953b), and its enormous influence on economists and policymaking, are not 
mentioned in Krugman’s (2007a) article on Friedman.  In rationalizing this omission, Krugman 
(2007c) said, “I didn’t bring up exchange rate policy because I don’t think Friedman can be said 
to have made a deep intellectual contribution on the subject.”  The fact is that Krugman has 
acknowledged on the record that Friedman launched the literature on flexible rates—which is by 
itself a deep intellectual contribution. 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
21 Their narrow conception of the interest-elastic component of aggregate demand supports the characterization of 
Keynesian economics in Friedman (1972a) and Bordo and Schwartz (2004).    19
(f) Rejection of credit controls.  Some Keynesians believed that formal and informal credit 
controls could serve a valuable monetary policy role, reducing the need for interest rates to rise 
when the authorities wanted to restrict aggregate demand.  Arthur Okun, for example, suggested 
that a “firm squeeze on the availability of credit can be applied… with a dozen telephone calls to 
commercial bankers.”  He argued that this “jawboning approach” could create a “pinch on 
availability without… interest rates anywhere near their present level.” (March 10, 1980, 
testimony, in Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 1980, pp. 53, 80.)  Paul 
Samuelson (1980) argued that with “direct limitations on borrowing, any desired slowdown in 
overall activity could have been contrived with interest rates not having to peak so high.” 
Friedman (1960) rejected the use of credit controls, arguing that open market operations 
were an unambiguously superior policy tool.  Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 145) suggested 
that direct controls on banks were ineffective, as they promoted growth in financial 
intermediaries not subject to the regulations.  Open market operations did not have this difficulty 
as they delivered symmetric signals to all financial intermediaries. 
The dismantling of credit controls and the focus on open market operations in modern 
central banking reflect acceptance of Friedman’s position on credit controls.  
 
4. The influence of monetarism on Krugman 
 
Krugman is not a specialist in monetary economics.  His lack of appreciation of the 
contributions of monetarism may partly reflect the fact that many monetarist ideas were already 
being incorporated by moderate Keynesians into their analysis by the time Krugman became 
active in economics.  This possibility is brought out by studying a 1970s textbook that Krugman 
regards highly, Dornbusch and Fischer (1978).  Krugman has recently stated (Krugman, 2007d): 
  The key thing is that good Keynesianism, as embodied even in undergrad textbooks of the time, 
was perfectly OK: Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978 edition, offered a description of what disinflation 
would look like that matches the experience of the ’80s reasonably well, and the textbook does not 
seem all that dated even now. 
 
We have no disagreement with Krugman on the merits of the Dornbusch-Fischer 
textbook.  But it is misleading simply to label its analysis as “good Keynesianism.”  A major   20
reason why Dornbusch and Fischer (1978) “does not seem all that dated even now” is because it 
incorporates many monetarist ideas.  Indeed, Dornbusch and Fisher (1978, p. 520) observe, 
  Much of the analysis of this book would, a few years ago, have been considered monetarist. 
 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 521) go on to acknowledge Friedman’s influence on monetary 
economics far more accurately and fairly than Krugman did:  
  The forceful and persuasive way in which Friedman has emphasized the role of money has 
changed the views of most economists on the importance of monetary policy.  
 
5.  Explaining Krugman’s view of modern monetary policy 
 
How could Krugman have arrived at so egregious a misunderstanding of the spirit and 
content of modern monetary policy?  And of their connections to Friedman’s monetary 
economics?  A possible explanation is that Krugman is unfamiliar with the literature of the past 
two decades incorporating monetarist perceptions into Keynesian and New Keynesian 
economics, but that he acquired superficial information about two positions of Friedman’s that 
central banks did not embrace.  In particular: (1) Friedman urged the Federal Reserve to adopt a 
constant growth rate for a monetary aggregate as a faute de mieux policy that would reduce the 
volatility of money growth; (2) Friedman recommended that the Fed use as its instrument the 
monetary base instead of the nominal Federal funds rate.  If Krugman regarded these two 
positions as the essence of monetarism, he could jump to the conclusion that monetarism was 
dead. 
It is worth reviewing the reasons that led Friedman to adopt these positions.
22  
Historically, major mistakes in monetary policy occurred in periods when central banks 
associated low nominal rates with easy policy, ignoring the signal—coming from a stagnant or 
declining money stock—that monetary policy was tight; or when they interpreted a high nominal 
rate as implying tight monetary policy, even when rapid money growth and high inflation 
suggested the opposite.  In addition, the use of the nominal interest rate as an instrument could 
lead to situations where the rate was pegged even though macroeconomic stabilization required a 
changing interest rate.  In evaluating Friedman’s position, Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 517) 
observed: “Each of these arguments on the dangers of conducting monetary policy by reference 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
22 See e.g. Friedman (1960, 1968, 1970b).   21
to nominal interest rates is important.”  The arguments led to Friedman’s preference for a 
monetary base instrument—with the aim of constant growth in the money stock (M2)
23—over an 
interest-rate instrument.  Friedman’s recommendations thus comprised both a change in target 
(toward constant growth in money) and a change in instrument (toward the use of the monetary 
base, or, in some presentations, total reserves).
24 
But these policy positions were never the central core of monetarist doctrine.  Indeed, in 
listing the basic propositions of monetarism, Friedman (1970b) did not include the constant-
money-growth rule or the base-instrument prescriptions.  Instead, monetarist propositions were 
defined as propositions about the structure of the economy and the effects of monetary policy.  
Friedman (1983, p. 4) went on to note that while he favored a constant money growth rule, 
“some monetarists favor varying the rate of growth in accordance with one or another rule.”  He 
subsequently observed: 
  Historically, monetarist policy has become associated with a particular prescription—slow, steady 
monetary growth.  That is not a necessary implication of monetarist theory.  A believer in 
monetarist theory still can favor an activist monetary policy as a way to offset other changes in 
the economy… (Friedman, 1984, p. 3.) 
 
But he added: 
 
  So far as monetarist theory is concerned, it will continue to be the bread and butter of monetary 
economics. (Friedman, 1984, p. 4.) 
 
Both New Keynesian economics and modern monetary policy practice can be thought of 
as indeed accepting monetarist theory as “the bread and butter of monetary economics.”  The 
Friedman policy prescriptions of constant money growth and a base instrument have been 
rejected, but many core theoretical and empirical propositions of monetarism have been 
incorporated into the mainstream.  Two central monetarist propositions—the nominal rate/real 
rate distinction; and the need for inflation control to be assigned to monetary policy—now guide 
the formulation of interest-rate policy by central banks in a way that they did not in the 1970s.  
Consequently, the recommendation that central banks move to a quantity instrument has fallen 
by the wayside, with monetary policy successes reducing the case for this reform. 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
23 Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) used a monetary aggregate that included currency, demand and time deposits, and 
so was similar to (though narrower in definition than) the monetary aggregate now defined officially as M2. 
24 Friedman’s desire that monetary authorities use a monetary quantity as an instrument was conceptually distinct 
from his advocacy of monetary targeting.  Advocacy of an M2 target is not in itself a rejection of the interest rate as 
an instrument, since the interest rate in principle could be varied so as to hit the M2 target.   22
Friedman understood that interest-rate instrument rules could in principle deliver stable 
inflation, and that the choice between the interest rate and the monetary base as an instrument 
was consequently a tactical, not a strategic, matter.
25  But actual experience with interest-rate 
rules in most countries up to the late 1970s was discouraging.  With policymakers apparently 
unwilling or unable to make the interest-rate decisions needed to restore price stability, a base 
instrument rule had merits as an automatic means of delivering the needed movements in interest 
rates.  To repeat, the switch in many countries after the late 1970s to more stabilizing interest-
rate rules did not come by accident, but arose from acceptance of core monetarist propositions.  
The foundation of that regime change, and of interest-rate decisions today, is acceptance of 
Friedman’s (1980a) position, noted earlier, that “monetary restraint is a sufficient condition for 
controlling inflation.” 
Financial innovations, such as sweeps programs and interest payments on money, have 
loosened the relationship between many monetary aggregates and nominal GDP.  With some 
monetary aggregates (e.g., M1 in the United States) affected more seriously by innovation than 
others, defining money has become a more difficult empirical task.  In light of these 
developments, the most durable aspects of monetarist theory are those that hold even in 
environments where there are not reliable money data.  We listed and elaborated these aspects of 
monetarism in the preceding sections, with particular reference to Friedman’s work. 
At the same time, financial change is not in itself a legitimate reason for not devoting 
resources to the careful measurement and study of money, nor a basis for ignoring monetary 
aggregates when making policy decisions.  What is more, the value of money (both as an 
indicator and as a candidate policy instrument) is likely to increase when short-term nominal 
interest rates reach very low values, as in the cases of Japan in the 1990s and the United States in 
the Great Depression.  We consider those cases in detail in the next section.  Monetary 
aggregates may also be valuable data for central banks that have occasion to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market.  Information on base money becomes useful because central-bank 
sterilization of the exchange transaction—i.e., operations in domestic securities markets that 
offset the impact of the foreign exchange operation on the aggregate level of base money—may 
be the most reliable means of ensuring that the intervention does not produce an unintended 
change in aggregate demand. 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
25 See, for example, Friedman (1980b).   23
6.  Evidence contradicting claims for a liquidity trap in the United States  in the 1930s 
     and in Japan in the 1990s 
 
United States 
As Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p. 52) emphasize, the Federal Reserve’s behavior in 
the course of the 1929−33 Great Contraction can be broken into an initial period of monetary 
restriction until 1930, and a period of monetary collapse from 1930, intensified by specific 
Federal Reserve actions from late 1931.  The fact that the situation deteriorated from 1930 
should not detract from the fact that monetary policy was already highly restrictive in 1928−30.  
Krugman claims that Friedman’s AEA Presidential Address (Friedman, 1968) engaged in crude 
assertion by stating that the Federal Reserve “permitted a sharp reduction in the monetary base.”  
In fact, the monetary base declined over 5 percent from April 1928 to October 1930 (Friedman 
and Schwartz, 1963a, pp. 290, 340–342, and 803).  It was this initial period of monetary 
restriction that Friedman was referring to in his AEA Presidential Address.  Moreover, he was 
not suddenly emphasizing a theme that had not been raised by himself and Schwartz in previous 
accounts; the accounts of the Great Contraction in Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 1963b) noted 
the monetary tightness of the 1920s, and Friedman (1962, p. 46) referred to the “unusually tight 
monetary conditions” of 1928−30.  The role of the Federal Reserve in producing the initial 
economic downturn is also stressed by Bernanke (2002), who referred to the “policy tightening 
of 1928−29.” 
But it was the severe contraction from late 1930 that transformed the downturn into a 
Depression.  The coexistence of a depressed economy and low nominal interest rates in the 
1930s prompted Keynes (1936) to introduce the concept of a liquidity trap on which Krugman 
places such emphasis.
26  Keynes himself expressed some quibbles about its empirical validity, 
but on the whole came out in favor of the liquidity trap as a relevant concept for analyzing the 
conditions of the 1930s.
27 
In surveying situations in which short-term nominal interest rates have fallen to zero or 
close to that, and aggregate demand is depressed, some economists look for a liquidity trap.  An 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
26 The name, liquidity trap, was originated by Dennis Robertson (see, for example, Robertson, 1940); Keynes did 
not name the concept.  Hawtrey’s (1932) “credit deadlock” concept closely overlaps with the vision of monetary 
policy ineffectiveness seen in the liquidity trap scenario; see Laidler (2007). 
27 Friedman (1972a) documented the preponderance of references in the General Theory to the liquidity trap.   24
open market purchase by the central bank cannot reduce the interest rate already at the zero 
bound.  In such circumstances, monetary policy may be helpless according to the theory.  Keynes 
referred to a low level of the long-term rate of interest, not the short-term rate, but for supporters 
of a liquidity trap currently, it is often enough to identify it as relevant whenever short-term 
nominal rates are at the zero bound.  For them, it seems, no further substantiation is needed. 
Economists like Krugman interpret the phenomena of the United States in the 1930s and 
in Japan in the 1990s as examples of a liquidity trap.  But examination of the actual policies of 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan provides evidence that refutes the liquidity trap 
interpretation. 
It is well known that the majority of Federal Reserve policymakers in the Great 
Depression opposed open market purchases that a minority favored as a way of invigorating the 
economy.  The opposition had nothing to do with the liquidity trap notion.  The opposition to 
open market purchases was based on adherence to the real bills doctrine.  The real bills doctrine 
taught that Fed purchases of government securities were an illegitimate speculative use of 
monetary policy.  Only commercial bank borrowing at the discount window of the Fed was an 
acceptable use of monetary policy because it was assumed to be for productive purposes, i.e., to 
underpin projects that expanded the stock of productive capital.  Over and above their adherence 
to this flawed doctrine, opponents of expansive monetary policy operations believed that existing 
low nominal interest rates were evidence that monetary ease had already been achieved.   
To argue the case for a liquidity trap, its advocates should have been able to cite either 
reductions in reserve requirements on commercial banks or Fed open market purchases that 
increased bank reserves and the stock of money, but that did not induce the public to spend any 
of their additional money balances.  There was no action in the Fed to reduce reserve 
requirements during the 1930s and there was no support for an open market purchase until April 
1932, when, to forestall Congressional plans to adopt measures that the Fed perceived as 
inflationary, the Fed finally undertook moderate open market purchases.  The record shows that 
the operation resulted in an increase in the money supply, industrial production, and wholesale 
prices in the late summer and fall of 1932.  The general improvement of the economy led 
observers within the Fed to give weight to the possibility that July 1932 might be classified as 
the trough of the Great Contraction.  It was not to be.  The Fed ceased open market purchases in   25
August 1932 after Congress adjourned.  Had purchases continued, the collapse of the economy in 
the winter of 1933 might have been avoided (see Meltzer, 2003, pp. 373−374). 
It is on the issue of Federal Reserve behavior in the early 1930s that Krugman makes 
some of his most serious accusations against Friedman.  Essentially, Krugman argues that 
Friedman’s post-1963 writings distorted the message of the Monetary History.  But Krugman’s 
accusations are baseless, as we now show. 
Contrary to Krugman’s suggestion, the description of 1930s monetary policy as 
deflationary is not something Friedman thought up in 1967
28 to distort the Monetary History.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p. 52) referred to “deflationary actions on the part of the Federal 
Reserve System” in the 1930s in their paper “Money and Business Cycles.”  And the 2002 talk 
by Ben Bernanke twice characterized the 1930s as featuring “contractionary monetary policies,” 
not unlike Friedman’s description.   Another expert on this period, Christina Romer, notes that 
“the Federal Reserve deliberately raised the discount rate and as a consequence lowered the 
money supply substantially further” in 1931 (Romer, 1993, p. 32).  Friedman’s description of 
Federal Reserve policy as deflationary is consistent and accurate. 
Krugman contends that Friedman distorted the Monetary History in journalistic outlets, 
offering as evidence Friedman’s statement that the Depression was “produced by government 
mismanagement.”
29  But the Friedman statement is not a distortion.  A comparable formulation 
was used by Bernanke, who noted that the Federal Reserve failed to execute its duty “to improve 
the management of banking panics.”  There was, in short, government mismanagement. 
As Bernanke (2002) noted, banking panics prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve 
had had a circuit-breaker, because of the convention for clearinghouse associations to make 
arrangements that supported banks that were basically sound but suffering from deposit runs.  
The Federal Reserve’s existence was thought to have made such arrangements redundant: private 
institutions no longer had to serve as surrogate central banks (see Bernanke, 1983, pp. 259−260; 
Timberlake, 1984).  But as Friedman and Bernanke note, the Federal Reserve in the 1930s did 
not carry out the central banking function expected of it. 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
28 For his address in Friedman (1968), where he referred to the “highly deflationary policies” of the Federal Reserve 
in the Great Contraction. 
29 Incidentally, Krugman’s brings this quotation into his essay by writing, “By 1976 Friedman was telling readers of 
Newsweek that “the elementary truth is that the Great Depression was produced by government 
mismanagement,’…” This is another inaccuracy in Krugman’s essay, for the quoted passage (from Friedman, 
1976b) did not appear in Newsweek.    26
If Friedman’s intention was to distort the Monetary History to noneconomist readers, 
then his 1973 Playboy interview
30 offered an ideal opportunity. Yet Friedman told Playboy: 
  Just as banks all around the country were closing, the Fed raised the discount rate; that’s the rate 
they charge for loans to banks. Bank failures consequently increased spectacularly. We might 
have had an economic downturn in the thirties anyway, but in the absence of the Federal 
Reserve System—with its enormous power to make a bad situation worse—it wouldn’t have 
been anything like the scale we experienced. 
 
In this interview, Friedman clearly characterized the problem as Federal Reserve failure 
to support commercial banks.  That was the task the Federal Reserve was assigned when it was 
created, and it did not exercise that function.  Friedman did not imply—as Krugman (2007a) 
suggests—that “the Depression wouldn’t have happened if only the government had kept out of 
the way.”  Furthermore, Friedman’s emphasis on the discount-rate episode—a deflationary 
action by the Federal Reserve that compounded its inaction on the banking collapse—agrees 
with the Monetary History and with Bernanke’s retrospective. 
Another journalistic account by Friedman of the Great Contraction appeared in the San 
Francisco Chronicle in 1979 (Friedman, 1979).  Again, the mismanagement attributed to the 
government is clearly identified as failure of the Federal Reserve to support the private banking 
system.  In his 1979 article, Friedman observed: 
  The Great Depression was produced by a failure of government, by a failure of monetary policy.  
It was produced by a failure of the Federal Reserve System to act in accordance with the 
intentions of those who established it…. 
 
[I]t was in the management of this fundamental function of government that government failed 
and produced the Great Depression. 
 
Krugman prefers to ignore the inactive and deflationary aspects of 1930s Federal Reserve 
policy, instead stressing the increase in the monetary base that took place from 1930 to 1933.  
But the 1930–33 increase in the monetary base did not reflect official ease, as Krugman implies.  
The growth of the base was entirely the result of an increase in the currency component as the 
public withdrew their deposits from banks they distrusted, and converted the deposits into 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
30 Norman (1973).   27
currency.  The other component of the monetary base—bank reserves—declined, limiting the 
possibility of bank lending.
31 
Krugman’s (2007a) discussion takes for granted that expansion of the aggregate 
monetary base implies easy policy.  Apparently, only the aggregate of the base should be used 
for studying policy.  That is a strange dictum.  The aggregate matters, but there is no rule 
prohibiting analysis of the separate components.  There can be no dispute that how the base is 
split up between its currency and reserves components has different implications for commercial 
banks’ ability to increase their loans and investments (and thus create deposits).  Moreover, 
monetary policy actions can ensure an increase in bank reserves.  True, the division of the level 
of the monetary base between currency and reserves is ultimately a private sector decision.  It is, 
however, generally not the case that the way an increase in the monetary base is split between 
currency and reserves is independent of monetary policy.   For the circumstances that prevailed 
in the 1930s we can be confident that more expansionary open market operations would have 
prevented the reserves portion of the base from declining.  The fundamental reason for this is 
that the Federal Reserve is always able to expand its total balance sheet at a sufficient rate so that 
bulges in currency demand do not translate into drains on bank reserves and so into 
macroeconomic instability. 
  Nominal interest rates were very low in the 1930s, but such an environment does not 
prevent expansion of the money supply from being an effective means of stimulating aggregate 
demand. How does monetary expansion remain effective for stimulating demand?  The 
monetarist transmission mechanism (described, for example, in Friedman and Schwartz, 1963b, 
or Meltzer, 2003) offers an answer.  The bringing of the short-term nominal interest rate to zero, 
or near zero, does not imply that the scope for monetary expansion to stimulate the economy has 
been exhausted.  Other asset prices that matter for aggregate demand will be bid up (and 
corresponding implied yields on the assets lowered) by the increase in the money stock and the 
use of the extra money to purchase assets.  Even when the nominal rate is zero, there are a great 





31 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, pp. 739–740) for tabulation of data on bank reserves over this period.   28
Japan 
Japan’s experience after its stock market and property price collapse in the early 1990s 
was a fall in money market rates to less than 1 percent.  Here too Krugman interprets the low 
level of market rates as proof of a liquidity trap.  He takes for granted that Japan’s experience is a 
refutation of the Friedman-Schwartz position on monetary policy’s scope to stimulate the 
economy.  He ignores the proposals for monetary expansion in Japan made by Friedman (1997) 
and other monetarists during the 1990s.
32 
Japan was confronted with a banking system in disarray and an unprecedented level of 
government debt in addition to a falling price level and recessionary conditions.  Ambivalence 
was prevalent about what policy to pursue, with the Bank of Japan maintaining well into the late 
1990s that low nominal interest rates were proof that it was following an easy policy.  Eventually 
a more affirmative policy was introduced, with the “quantitative easing” program undertaken by 
the Japanese monetary authorities from 2001.  This policy can be criticized for having been 
begun too late and for being too opaque compared to alternative programs of sustained monetary 
expansion.  But in retrospect it appears that the economy did respond to the quantitative easing, 
which involved increases in the monetary base and deliberate injections of reserves into the 
banking system.  As discussed by Ugai (2007), the empirical evidence suggests that the Bank of 
Japan’s operations were successful in stimulating aggregate demand via the term structure and 
other channels.  Monetary policy revived the economy and contradicted the picture of ineffective 
monetary policy painted by the liquidity trap story. 
  The monetary stimulus from 2001 is a more plausible explanation for Japan’s economic 
recovery than Krugman’s (2007a) suggestion that technological innovation stimulated a revival 
of investment in Japan.  A technological innovation by itself would stimulate aggregate supply 
but not aggregate demand, and so would be a source of deflation and a worsening output gap.  
Monetary expansion created the conditions for nominal aggregate demand to expand and so 
allowed a sustained increase in real aggregate demand. 




32 See Orphanides (2004) for comparisons of Japan’s experience in the 1990s with the conditions in the United 
States in the 1930s.  Orphanides concludes that neither period can be described using the liquidity trap scenario.   29
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
  Paul Krugman is a respected trade theorist.  But he does not speak authoritatively on 
subjects on which he has no expertise.  Monetary economics is not his field of expertise.  
Krugman’s research background does not qualify him as an authority on Milton Friedman’s 
work.  Krugman’s scholarly publications rarely mentioned Friedman and, when they did, they 
acknowledged the contributions of Friedman and monetarism in a way that contradicts his 
(2007a) essay on Friedman.  Friedman’s reputation is intact despite Krugman’s deplorable 
efforts to denigrate him and his contributions.  30
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